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 The Jury is Out: Mandating Pre-
Treatment Arbitration Clauses in 
Patient Intake Contracts 
SARAH SACHS* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Each year, more than two hundred thousand people are killed and more than 
one hundred and thirty thousand people are injured by medical error, much of which 
is preventable.1  Traditionally, the tort system provided means of recovery for 
wrongful deaths and patient injuries through malpractice claims.  However, in an 
era where practitioners are attempting to deter publicity, jury awards, punitive dam-
ages, extensive discovery, and class actions, arbitration is viewed as a shield from 
these “evils.”2 
Mandatory arbitration clauses have become ubiquitous in a broad range of in-
dustries, including the healthcare industry.3  Doctors, hospitals, and health plans are 
following the lead of other industries by requiring plan enrollees and patients to 
agree to mandatory arbitration of disputes prior to receiving treatment.4  Arbitration 
clauses emerging in the healthcare setting are in many cases mandatory and bind-
ing.5  These clauses are embedded in health plan contracts with insurance purchas-
ers and presented to patients by hospitals and physicians at the outset of treatment.6  
Such clauses stipulate that all future disputes between the patient and the hospital 
or physician must be resolved through mandatory arbitration, which results in par-
ties waiving their right to trial or judicial oversight of their disputes.7 
Unfortunately, most patients are unaware they are waiving their right to a jury 
trial or judicial oversight of their disputes when signing health providers’ patient 
intake contracts.  A vast majority of patients do not read medical disclosures, or 
have the sophistication to understand the information contained within them.8  Even 
if patients were to read the fine print of health providers’ contracts, patients are still 
likely to fail to recognize that the contract contained an arbitration clause. 9  Further, 
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 1. Lydia Nussbaum, Trial and Error: Legislating ADR for Medical Malpractice Reform, 76 Md. L. 
Rev. 247, 248-49 (2017). 
 2. Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?, 57 Stan. L. Rev. 1631, 1631 
(2005). 
 3. Id. 
 4. Elizabeth Rolph et. al., Arbitration Agreements in Health Care: Myths and Reality, 60 L. & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 153, 154 (1997). 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Myriam E. Gilles, Operation Arbitration: Privatizing Medical Malpractice Claims, 15 
THEORETICAL INQUIRES IN LAW 671, 687 (2014). 
 9. Id. 
1
Sachs: The Jury is Out: Mandating Pre-Treatment Arbitration Clauses in P
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2018
118 JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION [Vol. 2018 
if a patient recognized and refused to sign a mandatory arbitration clause, doctors 
and hospitals containing mandatory arbitration clauses in their patient intake con-
tracts reserve the right to forfeit treatment if the patient refuses to sign. Refusal to 
sign is a ground to refuse treatment, unless the patient faces a medical emergency.  
Doctors, hospitals, and health plans requiring mandatory arbitration concern patient 
advocates because often times patients are not in a position to negotiate at the time 
the contract is executed.10  In fact, no negotiation occurs when patients sign arbitra-
tion clauses buried in a doctor’s office or hospital admissions paperwork.11  The 
repercussions on patients forced into mandatory and binding arbitration after a dis-
pute arises from medical treatment can be catastrophic for patients and their loved 
ones, while beneficial for doctors, hospitals, and health plan providers. 
This Comment advocates against the use of mandatory arbitration clauses in 
healthcare providers’ patient intake contracts and discusses the interplay between 
federal and state statutes that create disparities in enforceability and unenforceabil-
ity of mandatory arbitration clauses in state courts.  Part II discusses the history of 
mandatory arbitration and its development in healthcare providers’ patient intake 
contracts.  Part III examines state statutory limitations on pre-treatment arbitration 
clauses.  Finally, Part IV addresses how courts analyze these agreements and pos-
sible approaches to avoid mandatory arbitration arising in healthcare providers’ pa-
tient intake contracts. 
II.  HISTORY OF MANDATORY ARBITRATION AND PATIENT 
INTAKE CONTRACTS 
The United States Supreme Court has taken a “bipolar approach to arbitra-
tion.”12  During the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, courts were hostile 
towards arbitration13 agreements.14  However, in recent years the Supreme Court 
has largely supported arbitration agreements, even when mandatory.15  Courts en-
forcing mandatory arbitration clauses in healthcare providers’ patient intake con-
tracts are governed and guided by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). 
A.  The Federal Arbitration Act 
Federal support for alternative dispute resolution (ADR) agreements, such as 
arbitration clauses, surfaced in 1925 when Congress enacted the United States Ar-
bitration Act.16  After the enactment of the act, courts generally disfavored arbitra-
tion clauses and deemed them unenforceable because the courts viewed arbitration 
                                                        
 10. Nussbaum, supra note 1, at 275. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Lauren Gaffney, The Circle of Assent: How “Agreement” Can Save Mandatory Arbitration in 
Long-Term Care Contracts, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1017, 1023 (2009). 
 13. Arbitration is defined as “a dispute-resolution process in which the disputing parties choose one 
or more neutral parties to make a final and binding decision resolving the dispute.” BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 14. See Kulukundis Shipping Co., S/A, v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 984 (2d Cir. 1942); 
Jodi Wilson, How the Supreme Court Thwarted the Purpose of the Federal Arbitration Act, 63 CASE W. 
RES. L. REV. 91, 98 (2012). 
 15. Id.; (Arbitration is considered mandatory when required by contract.) 
 16. United States Arbitration Act, ch. 392, 61 Stat. 883 (1925) (current version at 9 U.S.C.). 
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as encroaching on its domain of jurisdiction.17  However, starting in 1947, courts 
began to favor arbitration agreements when the enactment was codified under the 
FAA.18  The FAA governs the enforcement of contractual agreements to arbitrate 
disputes involving maritime transactions and interstate commerce.19  Section 2 of 
the FAA, which is the “primary substantive provision of the Act,”20 provides that 
arbitration agreements in writing are valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon 
such grounds that exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.21  Un-
der Section 2, the Supreme Court has held the FAA as a “liberal federal policy fa-
voring arbitration agreements.”22  After a series of Supreme Court rulings, the reach 
of the FAA statute has expanded over the years. 
Beginning in the late 1950s, the Supreme Court deliberated on a number of 
cases interpreting the FAA.23  The Court held that the FAA is a substantive rather 
than procedural law,24 and that it was enacted by Congress pursuant to its power to 
regulate interstate commerce.25  These rulings established that the FAA preempts 
state law to the extent that state law is inconsistent with the FAA or “to the extent 
that it stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full pur-
poses and objectives of Congress.”26  Therefore, the FAA gave courts broad 
preemptive power over state laws disfavoring arbitration.  Following these rulings, 
many states consented to the federal government’s endorsement of arbitration and 
adopted their own versions of the FAA. 
As states began adopting their own versions of the FAA, the Supreme Court 
enhanced the FAA’s strength by further preempting state law.  For example, in Doc-
tor’s Associates v. Casarotto, the Court held that Montana’s state statute treating 
arbitration clauses differently than standard contract language was inconsistent with 
the FAA.27  The Court concluded that the state statute placed special burdens on 
arbitration clauses that conditioned the enforcement of such provisions on the com-
pliance with the state statutory requirements, and therefore preempting the FAA.28  
The decision in Casarotto established that state statutes’ role in interpreting arbitra-
tion clauses is limited, and that basic issues of enforceability of contractual arbitra-
tion clauses are answered by federal law.29  Casarotto opened the door for states to 
limit the enforceability of arbitration clauses. Yet, it left unanswered bright-line 
rules for state statutes to preempt the FAA. 
Recent state court decisions attempted to clarify the power left to states in de-
termining the validity of arbitration agreements.  While Casarotto seems to estab-
lish that the FAA preempts all areas of law that Congress has addressed in the stat-
ute, courts have held that only state statutes that are inconsistent with the FAA are 
                                                        
 17. Gaffney, supra note 12, at 1023. 
 18. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2018). 
 19. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (2018). 
 20. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Contr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983). 
 21. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2018). 
 22. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp., 460 U.S. at 24. 
 23. Rolph, supra note 4, at 160. 
 24. See Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198, 203 (1956). 
 25. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 403-05 (1967). 
 26. Rolph, supra note 4, at 160. 
 27. 517 U.S. 681, 681-82 (1996). 
 28. Id. at 682. 
 29. Rolph, supra note 4, at 160. 
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preempted.30  Prior to Casarotto, some state courts interpreted the FAA’s preemp-
tive effect to preclude application of state contract law, despite the fact that the FAA 
did not address issues of state contract law.31  However, Casarotto identifies uncon-
scionability as a state law doctrine which “may be applied to invalidate arbitration 
clauses without contravening Section 2,” because the FAA does not address that 
issue.32  Therefore, state courts may generally regulate arbitration clauses “under 
general contract law principles,”33 such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability with-
out conflicting with the FAA.34  However, state courts cannot invalidate arbitration 
clauses solely based on state laws specific to arbitration.  The tension between the 
FAA and state statutes may motivate doctors and hospitals to add pre-treatment 
arbitration clauses to their patient intake contracts because the FAA’s broad reach 
is likely to preempt state statutes limiting arbitration clauses. 
B.  Use of Mandatory Arbitration Clauses in Patient Intake Contracts 
The use of alternative dispute resolution emerged in the healthcare industry 
after unexpected growth in medical malpractice claims in the 1970s.35  Legislatures 
believed that large jury awards led to rapid growth in physician malpractice insur-
ance premiums and in some states threatened specialty care.36  State legislatures 
responded to the increase in medical malpractice claims by implementing forms of 
alternative dispute resolution as well as tort reform to control the risk and costs of 
large jury verdicts.37  State legislatures implemented shortened statutes of limita-
tions, caps on damages, collateral source rules requiring courts to avoid double 
compensation for the same injury, and mediation and binding arbitration as a fa-
vored means to resolve disputes.38  These legislative initiatives intended to make it 
harder for patients to bring medical malpractice claims and reduce the rising cost of 
medical expenses.39 
With the continued expansion of healthcare services, the potential for disputes 
has drastically increased despite implementation of state legislation.40  As insurance 
plans and providers attempt to contain the cost of healthcare, a whole new class of 
disputes arose over coverage.41  Insurance companies and managed care plans cre-
ated a new class of disputes by denying treatment to patients and acting as treatment 
decision-makers.42  Denial of treatment or coverage can result in patients forgoing 
necessary treatment, which can result in further health complications and even 
death.  As a result, some patients are more likely to challenge the medical judgments 
and competence of providers.  Thus, doctors, hospitals, and health plans, to find a 
                                                        
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. at 161. 
 33. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 281 (1995). 
 34. Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 687. 
 35. Rolph, supra note 4, at 153. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. See Scott Forehand, Helping the Medicine Go Down: How a Spoonful of Mediation Can Alleviate 
the Problems of Medical Malpractice Litigation, 17 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 907, 912-13 (1999). 
 39. Nussbaum, supra note 1, at 251. 
 40. Rolph, supra note 4, at 154. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
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more efficient, more predictable, and arguably less threatening mechanism for dis-
pute resolution, are following the lead of certain other industries by requiring pa-
tients to agree to pre-treatment mandatory binding arbitration.43 
While the use of mandatory arbitration clauses may not be an industry norm, 
the use of such clauses is on the rise.44  The use of pre-treatment clauses are popping 
up in physician and patient contracts, physician and malpractice insurance provider 
contracts, as well as patient and insurance company or HMO contracts.  State legis-
latures’ advancement of these clauses in the healthcare setting is evident through 
notable nationwide support of state statutes regulating pre-treatment and post-treat-
ment arbitration clauses. 
Six states have authorized pre-treatment arbitration clauses by statute—Alaska, 
California, Colorado, Louisiana, South Dakota and Utah.45  The statutes in these 
states require one of the following provisions: (1) right of revocation;46 (2) notifi-
cation that treatment is conditioned on acceptance of the agreement;47 and/or (3) 
notice of waiver of rights.48  The California and Colorado statutes contain manda-
tory language that must be included in the contract for the pre-treatment arbitration 
clause to be held enforceable.49  Michigan, Wyoming, and Maine had pre-treatment 
arbitration statutes that were later repealed.50 
Sixteen other states have statutes which provide that parties may agree to arbi-
trate post-treatment medical disputes.51  Some of these statutes also provide man-
datory language that must be included in the contract for the arbitration clause to be 
held enforceable.  Eighteen other states use other forms of alternative dispute reso-
lution such as mediation and panels to resolve post-treatment medical disputes.52  
                                                        
 43. Id. 
 44. A. Thomas Pedroni & Ruth F. Vadi, Mandatory Arbitration or Mediation of Health Care Liability 
Claims?, 39 MD. B.J. 54, 56 (2006). 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. (Alaska (ALASKA STAT. § 6.5.485); California (CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE§ 1363.1); Col-
orado (COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-64-403); Louisiana (LA. STAT. ANN. § 9:4230 et seq.); South Dakota 
(S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-25B-1 et seq.); and Utah (UTAH CODE ANN. § 78b-3-416 et seq.); Right of 
revocation allows a patient to revoke from the contract without the need to provide any reason. 
 47. Id. (Alaska, Colorado, and Utah). 
 48. Id. (California, Colorado, and Utah). 
 49. Id. 
 50. Pedroni & Vita, supra note 45, at 57. (Michigan (MICH. COMP. LAWS § 60.5040); Wyoming 
(WYO. STAT. ANN. § 9-2-1502); Maine (ME. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 2701-15). 
 51. Heather Morton, Medical Liability/ Malpractice ADR and Screening Panels Statutes, NAT’L 
CONFERENCE OF ST. LEGISLATORS (2014), http://www.ncsl.org/research/financial-services-and-com-
merce/medical-liability-malpractice-adr-and-screening-panels-statutes.aspx; Alabama (ALA. CODE § 6-
5-485); Delaware (DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 6803); Florida (FLA. STAT. § 766.207); Maryland (MD. 
CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-28-01); Ohio (OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2711.22); Virginia (VA. 
CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.12); Georgia (GA. CODE ANN. § 9-9-61); Illinois (750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 15); 
Vermont (VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 7001); Louisiana (LA.. STAT. ANN. § 9:4230); New Jersey (N.J. REV. 
STAT. § 2A:23A-20); New York (N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3045); North Carolina (N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.60); 
South Carolina (S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-79-120); Texas (TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §74.451); 
Washington (WASH. REV. CODE § 7.70A.010). 
 52. Id.; Connecticut (CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-190c); District of Columbia (D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-
2821); Hawaii (HAW. REV. STAT. § 671-11); Idaho (IDAHO CODE § 6-1001); Indiana (IND. CODE § 34-
18-8-4); Kansas (KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3413); Maine (ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §2851); Massa-
chusetts (MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 60B); Montana (MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-6-101); Nebraska 
(NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-2840); Nevada (NEV. REV. STAT. § 41A.081); New Hampshire (N.H. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 519-B:1); New Mexico (N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-5-14); North Dakota (N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-
42-01); Oregon (OR. REV. STAT. § 31.250); Pennsylvania (40 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1303.714); West Vir-
ginia (W. VA. CODE § 55-7B-6); Wisconsin (WIS. STAT. § 655.42). 
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The remaining ten states only have general arbitration statutes, which are applied to 
guide enforcement of arbitration agreements in all industries including disputes 
arising in health care contracts.53  State statutes requiring the use of some form of 
alternative dispute resolution, whether it be arbitration or mediation, have drasti-
cally increased as the healthcare industry has evolved into a business focused on 
volume and profitability of services provided. 
i.  Consumer Versus Patient 
Profit driven interests in the healthcare industry alter the physician-patient re-
lationship into a producer-consumer relationship.  Doctors, hospitals, and health 
plan providers blur the line between patients and consumers by including pre-treat-
ment mandatory arbitration clauses.  Unlike companies such as banks, phone com-
panies, internet service providers, and e-commerce merchants, where mandatory 
arbitration clauses are commonplace in consumer contracts, the healthcare industry 
provides a service that deviates from a typical producer-consumer relationship. 
The producer-consumer relationship assumes, perhaps incorrectly, that both 
parties have equal bargaining power.54  Where there is unequal bargaining power, 
however, the law attempts to compensate for some inequality in power by regulat-
ing producers to an extent so that consumers are able to make informed and volun-
tary choices.55  However, consumer protection laws are solely concerned with the 
consumer’s freedom to make voluntary choices, not their possession of specialized 
knowledge.56 
The patient-physician relationship is different because it assumes inequality 
between the patient and the physician.57  The physician is likely to have more 
knowledge about medical information than the patient, thus imposing a fiduciary 
duty on the physician to apply their expertise in the best interest of the patient ac-
cording to professional standards.58  The presumption that patients are on unequal 
bargaining grounds does not suggest patients are incapable of making medical de-
cisions.  Rather the assumption suggests that patients lack access to specialized 
knowledge other than reliance on their physician.  Therefore, the law treats con-
sumers and patients differently.  Whereas consumers do not solely rely on producers 
to make their purchasing decisions, patients are likely to solely rely on physicians’ 
specialized knowledge in order to make informed medical decisions.59 
Transforming the physician-patient relationship into a producer-consumer re-
lationship through mandatory arbitration clauses abuses the unequal bargaining 
                                                        
 53. Id. (Arizona, Arkansas, Iowa, Kentucky, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Oklahoma, Rhode Is-
land, Tennessee). 
 54. See generally Wendy K. Mariner, Standards of Care and Standard Form Contracts: Distinguish-
ing Patient Rights and Consumer Rights in Managed Care, 15 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 1, 8 
(1998). 
 55. Id. at 5. 
 56. Id. at 8. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. (“[The] inherent imbalance in knowledge and skill is a defining characteristic of the physician-
patient relationship. Moreover, patients are usually sick and not able to function at their own normal 
capacity.”) 
 59. Id. at 9. 
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power of patients.  Furthermore, treating patients as consumers takes medical mal-
practice claims primarily rooted in tort law to be governed by contract law.60  In 
other words, even though the merits of the claim will still be governed by tort law, 
the initial proceedings are governed by contract law. The initial proceedings gov-
erned by contract law could result in different treatment of the claim by the arbitra-
tion panel, depending on the contractual provisions of the agreement. 
ii.  Tort Law versus Contract Law 
Medical malpractice liability is grounded in tort law.61  The objective of the 
tort system is to compensate patients for their injuries and damages sustained by a 
negligent party.  Therefore, the tort system acts in two parts: To dispense “corrective 
justice” and to deter negligence.62  Negligent medical care or medical malpractice 
is generally the failure to do what a reasonable doctor or provider in the same situ-
ation would have done under similar circumstances.63  A patient is only entitled to 
compensation for financial losses, such as lost earnings, medical bills, and non-
economic damages for pain and suffering, when a judge or jury finds that the pa-
tient’s injury was caused by the negligence of the doctor’s substandard care.64 
The emerging use of mandatory binding arbitration takes medical malpractice 
claims outside the realm of tort law and restricts such claims to contract law.  Com-
bining claims of health plans grounded in contract law and patient treatment 
grounded in tort law, further complicates resolution of medical malpractice claims 
to the detriment of patients.  For example, in Kuhl v. Lincoln National Health Plan 
of Kansas City, Inc.,65 the Eight Circuit held that a medical malpractice claim was 
not valid because it involved an HMO provider’s refusal to pay for treatment outside 
its network.  The health plan denied surgery at an out-of-network hospital, eventu-
ally resulting in the patient’s death.  The court evaluated the denial of treatment by 
the health plan as a contractual issue.  Therefore, the claim was not evaluated under 
a negligence standard pursuant to tort law, but could only be challenged or voided 
by contract law.66  The court’s holding resulted in no recovery for the injury sus-
tained by the patient.  Distinguishing between contract law and tort law is outcome 
determinative for a patient’s damages recovery.  Allowing contract law to govern, 
often results in no recovery for patients and full protection of doctors, hospitals, and 
health plans.  Mandatory arbitration protects doctors, hospitals, and health plans at 
the expense of patients. 
                                                        
 60. Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Contracting with Tortfeasors: Mandatory Arbitration Clauses and Per-
sonal Injury Claims, 67 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 253, 254 (2004). 
 61. Nussbaum, supra note 1, at 254. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 255. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Kuhl v. Lincoln Nat’l Health Plan of Kansas City, Inc., 999 F.2d 298 (8th Cir. 1993). 
 66. See id. 
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III.  REGULATORY TENSION BETWEEN STATE STATUTES, THE 
FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT AND THE MCCARRAN-FERGUSON 
ACT 
A.  Texas Medical Liability Act 
In the spring of 1977, the Texas legislature passed the Medical Liability and 
Insurance Improvement Act (MLIIA), which was codified as Article 4590i of the 
Texas Revised Civil Statutes.67  During the intervening decades, parts of the statute 
have been declared unconstitutional and other parts have been judicially rede-
fined.68  In 2003, the legislature made changes to the MLIA and re-codified it in the 
Civil Practice and Remedies Code.69  As part of the revisions, the Texas Medical 
Liability Act (TMLA) authorized counties to adopt alternative dispute resolution 
systems.  The statute did not mandate medical malpractice claims to arbitration or 
screening panels.  However, the statute left it to the discretion of health care pro-
viders to utilize ADR procedures, such as mandatory arbitration clauses in patient 
intake contracts.  The legislature attempted to add a layer of consumer protection 
for patients by requiring the signature of the patient’s attorney for the agreement to 
be held valid.70  The statute also requires an arbitration agreement to contain written 
notice in bold-type, ten-point font that conspicuously warns the patient.71  Despite 
efforts to protect patients, issues of enforceability have arisen when arbitration 
clauses fail to strictly comply with the TMLA.72 
Until recently, Texas’s lower courts routinely rejected the argument that the 
FAA preempts strict compliance with the TMLA.73  However, a recent Texas Su-
preme Court decision changed the landscape for arbitration clauses in medical mal-
practice claims.74  In Fredricksburg Care Co., L.P. v. Perez,75 the Texas Supreme 
Court held that the FAA preempts the more stringent arbitration requirements set 
forth in section 74.451 of the TMLA.  The Court also held that the McCarran-Fer-
guson Act (“MFA”)76 does not “reverse preemption” from the FAA.77 
i.  The Fredricksburg Case 
In Fredricksburg, the company moved to compel arbitration based on a pre-
admission contract signed by the patient.78  Despite the pre-admission arbitration 
                                                        
 67. Texas Medical Association, Summary of Texas Medical Professional Liability Law, 
https://www.texmed.org/StatuteOfLimitations/ (last visited Oct. 14, 2017). 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.451. 
 71. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.451(a). 
 72. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.451(b). 
 73. Michael L. Hood & David M. Merryman, Med Mal Game Changer The Texas Supreme Court 
Strikes Down Bar to Arbitration Agreements, 78 TEX. B.J. 638 (2015). 
 74. Id. 
 75. Frederickson Care Co., L.P. v. Perez, 461 S.W.3d 513 (Tex. 2015), reh’g denied (June 26, 2015), 
cert. denied sub nom; Perez v. Fredericksburg Care Co., L.P., 136 S. Ct. 798 (2016). 
 76. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015. 
 77. Fredricksburg, 461 S.W.3d at 513. 
 78. Id. at 516. 
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clause’s failure to strictly comply with the TMLA,79  Fredricksburg asserted that 
federal law determined the enforceability of the arbitration clause under the FAA 
because the underlying patient-provider transaction involved interstate commerce.80  
The beneficiaries did not dispute that the FAA would normally preempt TMLA 
section 74.451 because the two laws directly conflicted, and therefore the FAA pre-
vented the arbitration clause from being invalidated.81  However, the beneficiaries 
argued that TMLA section 74.451 was part of a state law enacted “for the purpose 
of regulating the business of insurance,” which falls under the protection of the 
MFA.82  Under the MFA, Congress created an exemption from preemption for any 
federal law that can be “construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede any law en-
acted by any State for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance.”83 
The Texas Supreme Court held that the FAA applied and therefore strict com-
pliance of TMLA section 74.451 did not invalidate the arbitration clause.84  The 
court acknowledged that the TMLA was enacted with the intent to make health care 
more affordable, but held that the legislator’s goal of lowering costs was “too tenu-
ous of a connection to the business of insurance” to qualify for MFA protection.85  
The court also concluded that section 74.451, which applies between patients and 
providers, has little to do with the relationship between the insurance company and 
its policyholders.86 
The ruling in Fredricksburg has granted health care providers more flexibility 
to adopt pre-treatment arbitration agreements.87  If a health care provider can estab-
lish the FAA applies to the arbitration clause and preempts the TMLA, then the 
agreement must only satisfy the FAA’s requirements. FAA agreements are still sub-
ject to state law contract defenses, but preemption of the TMLA significantly re-
duces patient safeguards.  As a result, many providers may start including arbitra-
tion clauses in their pre-treatment contracts with patients. 
B.  Colorado Health Care Availability Act 
The Colorado legislature passed the Health Care Availability Act (HCAA) in 
1989.88  In 2003, the legislature amended the HCAA and declared that no individual 
or entity, other than the patient’s physician, may be held liable in any medical mal-
practice claim.89  Similar to the TMLA, the HCAA requires written notice in at least 
ten-point font with bold-faced type.90  The Colorado legislature protects patients by 
allowing a patient to rescind from the agreement by written notice to the physician 
within ninety days after signing the agreement or after release or discharge from the 
                                                        
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 516-17. (Fredricksburg Care Company received Medicare payments on behalf of the de-
ceased, which the court found sufficient to establish interstate commerce.) 
 81. Id. at 517. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Fredricksburg, 461 S.W.3d at 517, citing 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b). 
 84. Id. at 528. 
 85. Id. at 524. 
 86. Id. at 526-27. 
 87. Hood & Merryman, supra note 74, at 638. 
 88. 1989 Colo. Legis. Serv. H.B. 1294 (West). 
 89. The amendment promulgated the Colorado Supreme Court’s decision in Pediatric Neurosurgery, 
P.C. v. Russell, 44 P.3d 1063 (Colo. 2002) (Holding the corporate entity may be held vicariously liable 
for negligence through respondent superior). 
 90. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-64-403. 
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hospital.91  Unlike Texas state courts, Colorado state courts have upheld the en-
forceability of pre-treatment arbitration clauses only when the agreement strictly 
complies with the HCAA. 
Recently the Colorado Court of Appeals reinforced strict compliance with 
HCAA in Fischer v. Colorow Health Care, LLC.92  The court held in Fischer that 
the HCAA demands strict compliance with section 13-64-403(4).93  Therefore, non-
compliant arbitration clauses will be rendered unenforceable if challenged. 
i.  The Fischer Case 
In Fischer, Colorow Health Care, LLC (Colorow) moved to compel arbitration 
and plaintiffs opposed the motion based on noncompliance with HCAA require-
ments in section 13-64-403(3) and (4).94  The trial court rescinded the arbitration 
agreement explaining that “the entity seeking to enforce the arbitration agreement 
must be held to strict compliance with [the statutory] requirements.”95  The Court 
of Appeals affirmed the order of the trial court denying the motion to compel arbi-
tration.  The Court determined that strict compliance was necessary based on the 
legislative intent which is focused on ensuring binding arbitration clauses are “vol-
untary agreement[s] between a patient and health care provider. . . .”96  The Colo-
rado Supreme Court has granted certiorari in the Fischer case.  However, the cur-
rent law requires any pre-treatment arbitration clause to strictly comply with HCAA 
section 13-64-403. 
In Fischer, Colorow did not raise the issue that the arbitration clause is 
preempted by the FAA because the contract lacked interstate commerce or maritime 
transactions.  However, Colorow probably could invoke interstate commerce if the 
patient used any form of Medicare or insurance to pay for the health care services.  
The Court’s focus on strict compliance versus substantial compliance may have re-
sulted in a different outcome than if the provider argued the FAA preempts the 
HCAA. 
Eventually state arbitration statutes regulating medical malpractice claims 
could come before the United States Supreme Court for review.  The Supreme Court 
rejected to take up an appeal from the Fredricksburg case.  However, if other states, 
such as the Colorado Supreme Court, uphold strict compliance with state statutes 
for arbitration agreements, the United States Supreme Court may take up the issue 
to provide guidance on when the FAA preempts state statues enforcement of arbi-
tration clauses in healthcare contracts. 
                                                        
 91. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-64-403(3). 
 92. Fischer v. Colorow Health Care, LLC, 2016 COA 130, cert. granted, No. 16SC814, 2017 WL 
825315 (Colo. Feb. 21, 2017). 
 93. Id. at 8. 
 94. Id. at 1. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 6-7 (quoting Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-64-403(1)). 
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IV.  CHALLENGING MANDATORY ARBITRATION IN PATIENT 
INTAKE CONTRACTS 
Arbitration clauses are subject to contract law.  Therefore, courts must first 
determine whether a valid contract exists prior to assessing the validity of the arbi-
tration clause.97  To prove that a valid contract exists, four elements must be met: 
(1) the parties possessed the capacity to enter into a contract, (2) the parties mutually 
assented, (3) there must be a certain object for the contract, and (4) the contract 
must have a lawful purpose.98  If a valid contract does not exist, then a motion to 
compel mandatory arbitration is invalid because the FAA “does not require parties 
to arbitrate when they have not agreed to do so.”99 
When a valid arbitration clause exists, parties may seek to defeat a motion to 
compel arbitration by attempting to escape the purview of the FAA to apply more 
favorable state law.100  However, defeating a motion to compel arbitration is diffi-
cult because of the FAA’s broad reach. 
A.  Avoiding The FAA 
Avoiding the FAA is advantageous to a party seeking to evade a motion to 
compel arbitration because many state laws disfavor arbitration.  To avoid applying 
the FAA to an arbitration agreement, the party must prove that the underlying trans-
action does not involve interstate commerce.101  The Supreme Court has interpreted 
“interstate commerce” broadly102 and construed Section 2 of the FAA as applying 
to every arbitration agreement that private parties entered into with the full reach of 
the Commerce Clause.103  Applying the reach of the Commerce Clause to the FAA 
has expanded the applicable scope even further.  Courts have upheld arbitration 
clauses in individual cases without a showing of any specific impact upon interstate 
commerce.  Under the Commerce Clause, the FAA is invoked when a party proves 
a transaction represents a general practice subject to federal control and the general 
practice substantially affects interstate commerce.104  Therefore, a physician’s clinic 
or a hospital’s interstate transactions will likely satisfy the “interstate commerce” 
requirement, and the FAA will govern the pre-treatment arbitration agreement be-
tween the physician and patient.105 
                                                        
 97. See TranSouth Fin. Corp. v. Rooks, 604 S.E.2d 562 (2004). 
 98. See Wallace v. Sherve Mem’l Library, 79 F.3d 427, 430 n.4 (5th Cir. 1996). 
 99. See Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 478 (1989). 
 100. Gaffney, supra note 12, at 1029. 
 101. 9 U.S.C. § 2; See Allied-Bruce Terminix, 513 U.S. at 268. 
 102. Allied-Bruce Terminix, 513 U.S. at 268 (holding “a contract evidencing a transaction involving 
commerce” should be read broadly to extend the FAA to the outer limits of “Congress’ Commerce 
Clause power”). 
 103. Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 490 (1987). 
 104. Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc., 539 U.S. 52, 56 (2003). 
 105. McGuffey Health & Rehab. Ctr. v. Gibson ex rel. Jackson, 864 So. 2d 1061, 1063 (Ala. 2003) 
(holding Medicare funds moving across state lines should be considered to establish the interstate com-
merce connection); Owens v. Coosa Valley Health Care, Inc., 890 So. 2d 983 (Ala. 2004) (holding that 
nursing home services involved interstate commerce is unquestionably economic in nature under Citi-
zens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc., and can be within reach of the Commerce Clause); In re Nexion Health at 
Humble, Inc., 173 S.W.3d 67, 68 (Tex. 2005, as supplemented on denial of reh’g (Oct. 14, 2005) (holding 
Medicare funds crossing state lines makes the pre-admissions contract involve interstate commerce). 
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Courts have considered the receipt of Medicaid or Medicare funds, receipt of 
materials from other states, and any out-of-state offices in determining whether an 
agreement involved “interstate commerce.”106  Further, parties wishing to compel 
arbitration can argue that their facility is subject to federal regulation, which sub-
jects their arbitration clause to be governed by the FAA.  However, under rare cir-
cumstances, parties may escape the FAA in an “involving commerce” argument.  In 
Bruner v. Timberlane Manor Ltd. P’ship, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that 
accepting Medicare and Medicaid payments was insufficient to invoke the FAA 
“interstate commerce” clause.107  While other states have recognized Medicare or 
Medicaid funds to trigger preemption of contrary state law to the FAA, the Okla-
homa Supreme Court refused to follow such precedent because the United States 
Supreme Court has not ruled that Medicare or Medicaid is “an exercise of Congress’ 
Commerce Clause power.”108  Thus far, no other state has followed Oklahoma’s 
interpretation of interstate commerce.109  Therefore, it is largely difficult for the 
parties to escape the broad reach of the FAA. 
B.  Standard Contract Defenses 
Courts can refuse to enforce pre-treatment mandatory arbitration clauses in pa-
tient intake contracts based on standard contract defenses, such as fraud, duress and 
unconscionability without contravening the FAA.110  The most compelling standard 
contract defenses in pre-treatment arbitration contracts are unconscionability and 
lack of capacity. 
i.  Unconscionability 
Unconscionability111 arguments appear particularly promising to pre-treatment 
mandatory arbitration clauses because pre-dispute clauses are frequently found in 
contracts that are adhesive112 in nature.113  However, unconscionability arguments 
are rarely successful because unequal bargaining power or unfairness is usually not 
enough to invalidate a contract.114 
                                                        
 106. See Summit Health, Ltd. v. Pinhas, 500 U.S. 322, 329 (1991) (holding purchase of out-of-state 
medicines and acceptance of out-of-state insurance established interstate commerce); Triad Health 
Mgmt. of Ga., III, LLC v. Johnson, 679 S.E.2d 785, 788 (Ga. App. 2009) (applied FAA to nursing home 
contract when facility purchased supplies from out-of-state vendors, treated out-of-state patients, and 
received Medicaid and Medicare funding); Kansas City Urology, P.A. v. United Healthcare Servs., 261 
S.W.3d 7, 10 (Mo. App. 2008) (holding the FAA applies when some of the plaintiffs and the defendants 
reside in different states and their activities affect interstate commerce). 
 107. Bruner v. Timberlane Manor Ltd. P’ship, 155 P.3d 16, 31-32 (Okla. 2006). 
 108. Id. at 29-30. 
 109. Gaffney, supra note 12, at 1032. 
 110. See Swain v. Auto Servs., Inc., 128 S.W.3d 103, 107 (Mo. App. 2003). 
 111. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004) (Unconscionability is defined as an unfair or oppres-
sive contract to one party). 
 112. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004) (An adhesion contract is drafted by one party and 
signed by another party with weaker bargaining power. Courts carefully scrutinizes adhesion contracts 
and sometimes void provisions because of the possibility of unequal bargaining power, unfairness, and 
unconscionability). 
 113. David Allen Larson & Dr. David Dahl, Medical Malpractice Arbitration: Not Business as Usual, 
8 Y.B. on Arb. & Mediation 69, 75 (2016). 
 114. Id. 
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Unconscionability has two elements: procedural and substantive.115  Procedural 
unconscionability refers to the contract formation process and may include “fine 
print clauses, high pressure sales tactics or unequal bargaining positions.”116  Sub-
stantive unconscionability refers to undue harshness in the contract terms.117  A 
showing of procedural and substantive unconscionability is considered in determin-
ing whether an arbitration clause is unconscionable and void.118 
A critical question in determining unconscionability is whether each party 
made a meaningful choice.  Circumstances surrounding the transaction are consid-
ered in evaluating a meaningful choice, such as obvious education or lack of it, 
reasonable opportunity to understand the terms of the contract, or notification of 
important terms hidden in fine print or minimized by deceptive sales practices.119  
Unconscionability is a powerful defense because it invalidates contract terms “when 
a party of little bargaining power, and hence little real choice, signs a commercially 
unreasonable contract with little or no knowledge of its terms.”120  In such cases, 
courts may deem a contract in part or in whole unenforceable. 
The nature of pre-treatment patient intake contracts and mandatory arbitration 
clauses contained in them place patients at more of a risk of unconscionability.  For 
example, in Wheeler v. St. Joseph Hospital, the California Court of Appeals held an 
arbitration clause unconscionable when signed by a patient in a hospital admissions 
contract. 121  The court held that “a hospital’s standard printed ‘CONDITIONS OF 
ADMISSION’ form possesses all the characteristics of a contract of adhesion” be-
cause the would-be patient is in no position to reject the proffered agreement, to 
bargain with the hospital, or in lieu of agreement to find another hospital.122  Fur-
ther, the court justified its finding of unconscionability because the patient realisti-
cally had no choice but to seek hospital admission as directed by his physician and 
sign the printed forms necessary to gain admission.123  Unconscionability can be a 
powerful contract defense against standard print forms in patient intake contracts.  
However, standard print terms in pre-treatment patient contracts may not always be 
held unconscionable if a patient is reasonably aware of the terms and given the op-
portunity to read the terms.124  Therefore, patients may not rely on an unconsciona-
bility defense based solely on a pre-treatment contract containing standard print 
terms.  Depending on the surrounding circumstances, an unconscionability defense 
may or may not be a valid argument to avoid pre-treatment mandatory arbitration 
clauses. 
ii.  Lack of Capacity 
A valid arbitration clause requires mutual assent by competent parties at the 
time the contract is executed.  Challenging an arbitration agreement based on lack 
                                                        
 115. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 340 (2011). 
 116. Manfredi v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Kansas City, 340 S.W.3d 126, 132 (Mo. App. 2011). 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (1965). 
 120. Id. 
 121. Wheeler v. St. Joseph Hosp., 63 Cal. App. 3d 345 (1976). 
 122. Id. at 357. 
 123. Id. at 789. 
 124. Stanley D. Henderson, Contractual Problems in the Enforcement of Agreements to Arbitrate Med-
ical Malpractice, 58 VA. L. REV. 947, 986 (1972). 
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of capacity is a difficult defense because courts assume individuals are competent 
to enter contractual relationships.125  A party arguing a contract is unenforceable 
because the signor lacked mental capacity bears the burden of proving such inca-
pacity.126  Most courts will void contracts upon adequate showing that a party lacked 
mental capacity.127  In the healthcare setting, issues of capacity to consent to pre-
treatment mandatory arbitration clauses arise uniquely when patients sign contracts 
under extreme physical or mental distress. 
However, proving lack of capacity because of physical or mental distress is 
difficult. Generally, courts have followed the contract principle that “mere weak-
ness of mind or body, or of both, do not constitute what the law regards as a mental 
incompetency sufficient to render a contract voidable.”128  Weak-mindedness alone 
may not be sufficient to make a contract voidable, but could be highly relevant in 
determining overreach or fraud.129 
For example, in Kindred Hospitals Limited Partnership v. White,130 the Ken-
tucky Court of Appeals reversed the circuit court’s finding that an arbitration clause 
was void due to lack of capacity when a patient had previously been diagnosed with 
Stage III lung cancer and recently undergone a tracheostomy procedure.  The Court 
of Appeals concluded that the record evidenced the patient was very ill, but that 
alone does not equate to lack of capacity to enter a contract.131  The Court distin-
guishes White from Pikeville Med. Ctr. Inc. v. Bevins.132  In Bevins, the Court of 
Appeals affirmed the circuit court’s denial of a motion to compel arbitration be-
cause the patient was deemed to lack capacity to enter into a complex arbitration 
agreement at the patient’s admission to the hospital.133  The Court distinguishes 
these two cases by stating, “if substantial evidence supports a lack of capacity, a 
finding of lack of capacity could be sustained.”134  A lack of capacity defense is 
determined at the discretion of circuit courts.  Therefore, while a lack of capacity 
defense may be reasonable, because it is at the discretion of the court, it is not nec-
essarily a reliable defense to avoid a motion to compel pre-treatment arbitration 
clauses. 
                                                        
 125. Autumn Smith, You Can’t Judge Me: Mental Capacity Challenges to Arbitration Provisions, 56 
BAYLOR L. REV. 1051, 1055 (2004). 
 126. Id. at 1056. 
 127. Id. 
 128. See 5 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 10.8 (4th ed. 2017). 
 129. Id. 
 130. Kindred Hosps. Ltd. P’ship v. White, 2017 WL 4464339 (Ky. Ct. App. Oct. 6, 2017). 
 131. Id. at *3 (The circuit court based its conclusion on seven reasons: “1) Medical records indicating 
that the patient was awake and alert when she executed the agreement does not necessarily support she 
had contractual capacity to enter into the arbitration agreement at that time; 2) The patient’s prescription 
glasses had been misplaced; 3) The patient was alone and had no family members to assist her; 4) The 
patient was administered pain medications including oxycodone; 5) It was late at night; 6) The patient 
had been diagnosed with Stage III lung cancer and had recently undergone a procedure in which she was 
subjected to the insertion of a metal tracheostomy tube; and 7) The patient was unable to speak”). 
 132. Pikeville Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Bevins, 2014 WL 5420002 (Ky. Ct. App. Oct. 24, 2014). 
 133. Id. at *1. (Holding that an individual who was very sick at the time of his admission yet who was 
deemed capable of providing responses to questions regarding the course of medical treatment, could 
nonetheless be deemed incapable of reviewing and signing a complex contract in which he would be 
agreeing to waive a number of substantive rights). 
 134. Kindred Hosps. Ltd. P’ship, at *7 n.3. 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
As the healthcare crisis continues to develop, health providers will attempt to 
lower expenses at any cost.  Many health providers view arbitration clauses as a 
cost-saver for medical malpractice claims.  Therefore, physicians and hospitals are 
discretely placing pre-treatment mandatory arbitration clauses in patient intake con-
tracts.  Arbitration clauses are becoming more common and could become an ac-
cepted practice in the medical field, without patient awareness until after a dispute 
arises. 
In the healthcare context, patients signing a contract with an arbitration clause 
are often the weaker party and have not yet envisioned the possibility of future med-
ical malpractice disputes arising.  Pre-treatment mandatory arbitration becomes fun-
damentally unjust when patients’ rights are inconspicuously taken during vulnera-
ble times. Reforms must take place to protect patients. 
Despite the Supreme Court’s holding in Marmet Health Care Center, Inc. v. 
Brown135 that prohibits states legislatures from implementing laws that make pre-
disputed arbitration clauses in personal injury or wrongful death claims unenforce-
able, Congress and state legislatures should pass legislation to protect patients.  
Congress could prohibit mandatory, pre-treatment, binding arbitration clauses 
based on concerns of public policy.  Further, state legislatures could pass legislation 
that ensures meaningful consent is given during execution of contracts containing 
mandatory arbitration.  Lastly, educating the public and mandating physicians and 
hospital systems to give adequate notice of pre-treatment mandatory arbitration 
clauses contained in patient intake contracts can help patients make meaningful 
choices in selecting a physician or a hospital system. 
At some point all individuals rely on medical care from a physician or a hospital 
system.  Dependence on physicians and hospital systems is critical to individuals’ 
well-being.  It is vital that the legal system protects vulnerable patients and provides 






                                                        
 135. Marmet Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 565 U.S. 530 (2012). 
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